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ABSTRACT
Classifying network traffic is the basis for important network
applications. Prior research in this area has faced challenges
on the availability of representative datasets, and many of
the results cannot be readily reproduced. Such a problem
is exacerbated by emerging data-driven machine learning
based approaches. To address this issue, we provide three
open datasets containing almost 1.3M labeled flows in total,
with flow features and anonymized raw packets, for the re-
search community. We focus on broad aspects in network
traffic analysis, including both malware detection and appli-
cation classification. We release the datasets in the form of
an open challenge called NetML1 and implement several ma-
chine learning methods including random-forest, SVM and
MLP. As we continue to grow NetML, we expect the datasets
to serve as a common platform for AI driven, reproducible
research on network flow analytics.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in technology have provided researchers a
lot of data available for analysis. In particular, many studies
have been published in Computer Vision (CV), Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP), and lately Network Traffic Analysis
(NTA) investigating big data with Artificial Intelligence (AI)
approaches [9, 22, 24, 26]. Even though many benchmarks
and challenges are available for CV [6] and NLP fields [1],
there is a lack of common ground for network traffic analysis
for researchers to compare their results with others.
In the twenty-first century and digital era, network traffic
classification has become very important task with rapidly in-
creasing amounts of internet devices connected together. Net-
work traffic analysis, which is the classification of network
traffic into appropriate classes, has become vital for many ap-
plications such as quality of service (QoS) control, resource
allocation and malware detection. Particularly from cyberse-
curity perspective, a growing number of connected devices
are subject to cyber attackers and therefore it is a must to take
required precautions against these ever-increasing attempts
1https://github.com/ACANETS/NetML-Competition2020
of intrusions. However, it is very difficult to find compre-
hensive datasets for researchers to evaluate their proposed
techniques. In addition to that, having an appropriate dataset
is another major challenge too.
Network traffic analysis (NTA) techniques have evolved
from port-based approaches up to machine learning based
techniques over time. The first and easiest port-based ap-
proach has become obsolete since newer applications mostly
use dynamic port allocation instead of using standard regis-
tered port numbers. Then, network researchers begin using
payload or data packet inspection (DPI). As the volume of
encrypted traffic increases, payload-based approaches fail
which directed the researchers to employ machine learning
methods with flow statistical features since they do not rely
on port numbers or payload itself.
There have been a plethora of research attempting to clas-
sify and analyze network flows using a variety of datasets.
However, unlike the open datasets such as ImageNet [6] and
COCO [14] in computer vision research, it is very difficult to
find comprehensive datasets for researchers in networking
domain to evaluate their proposed techniques, and for the
community to reproduce prior art. Many agree that a com-
prehensive, up-to-date and open dataset for flow analytics is
dispensable for the network research community.
In this paper, we address a common ground for NTA and
introduce NetML Network Traffic Analytics datasets with
three specific collection of labeled network flows and their
features for researchers as a benchmarking platform to eval-
uate their approaches and contribute to NTA research. In
order to be comprehensive, we compile datasets for both
malware detection and application type categorization, two
representative applications. For malware detection tasks, we
introduce a new dataset NetML with raw traffic captures ob-
tained from Stratosphere IPS [20] website with almost 500k
network flow samples belonging to 20 different types of mal-
ware and benign classes. We also create another dataset for
malware detection which is obtained from the raw traffic
captures from well-known CICIDS2017 dataset [19]. We gen-
erate around 550k flow samples for 7 different malware types
and a benign class. Lastly, we introduce non-vpn2016 dataset
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with around 163k flow samples whose raw traffic data are
acquired from ISCX-VPN-nonVPN2016 dataset [10] contain-
ing different levels of annotations with a number of classes
ranging from 7 to 31. On top of those data, we provide pre-
liminary data analysis on flow features and baseline results
achieved using popular machine learning algorithms includ-
ing Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and
Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP). We host the dataset and re-
lease the implementations of the algorithms on github and
encourage the community to collaborate and grow the col-
lection.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold: First, we provide
a novel malware detection NetML dataset and curate two
other datasets originated from open source captures (named
as CICIDS2017 for malware detection and non-vpn2016
dataset for traffic classification). Second, we provide a plat-
form for researchers to participate in our firstly announced
network traffic analytics challenge and baseline results ob-
tained by RF, SVM and MLP models. We choose only Meta-
data features (such as number of packets, number of bytes,
time duration etc.) to expedite the efficiency of baseline clas-
sifiers; however, we strongly encourage researchers to inves-
tigate TLS, DNS and HTTP features as well.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview on literature search for malware detection and
traffic classification tasks. Section 3 explains the dataset col-
lection and preparation process along with a description of
extracted flow features. Preliminary dataset analysis results
with the flow features are explained in Section 4 while the
results achieved by the proposed baseline models are given
in Section 5. Finally, a brief information about the NetML
Challenge and workshop is provided in Section 6 and this
study is concluded in Section 7. In appendix, detailed graphs
for flow feature analysis are available.
2 RELATEDWORK
Increasing attention on network traffic analytics brings many
studies published recently. We will focus several of them
within two categories: malware detection and application or
traffic classification.
2.1 Malware Detection
Random Forest as ensemble classifier [27] and Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM) with Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel
(also called Gaussian kernel) as kernel machines [2] are two
effective ways amongmanymachine learning approaches for
network traffic analysis. However, most of the researchers
use their own data with their own features for NTA, which
makes it difficult to compare one study with another. For
instance, Anderson et al. [3] use flow metadata, sequence of
packet length and times, byte distribution and unencrypted
TLS header information to detect malware in TLS encrypted
traffic. Similarly, features extracted by Moore et al. [15] is a
broad example of total 249 features used in several studies
but only the different subsets of those features are used in
other studies meaning that there is not a unique best set of
features for NTA.
KDD-Cup 99 [13] and NSL-KDD datasets [21] are common
datasets widely used for malware detection. Several studies
have been conducted on those datasets to investigate the
ensemble model accuracies such as C4.5 algorithm, decision
tree, random forest, SVM and AdaBoost [7, 8, 12, 23]. After
a two-level classification algorithm that uses naive Bayesian
as the primary classifier in the first stage, and in the second
stage they use nominal-binary filtering and cross-validation
for testing is proposed by [16], further optimized two-level
detection algorithm using balanced forest in the first stage
and random forest for prediction in the second stage is im-
plemented by [17].
However, those two datasets are out of date and prone
to recently emerged attacks. CICIDS2017 dataset [19] is rel-
atively up-to-date and more suitable for detecting current
attacks. Authors introduce CICIDS2017 dataset with their re-
sults obtained using CICFlowMeter [11] features by compar-
ing several techniques including k-nearest neighbor (kNN),
random forest and ID3 and report best F1 score 0.98 for ID3
algorithm and 0.97 for random forest whose executing time
is one-third of ID3. Gao et al. [9] compare several machine
learning and deep learning techniques including Random
Forest, SVM and Deep Neural Networks on NSL-KDD and
CICIDS2017 datasets. They perform both binary malware
detection and multi-class classification and find out that RF
model achieves impressive malware detection accuracy and
comparable classification accuracy to other deep learning
models in multi-class classification task.
2.2 Traffic Classification
There are several researches on application classification
in network flow. For example, Conti et al. [5] use Random
forest with their own dataset and their own features and
achieve 95% accuracy on user action classification. Taylor et
al. [22] conclude that using statistical features of flow vectors
of raw packet lengths such as minimum, maximum, mean,
median, standard deviation on binary SVM and Random
Forest results in 95% accuracy, but when using multi-class
classifier, performance drops to 42% for SVM and 87% for RF.
Lashkari et al. [10] introduce UNB ISCX VPN-nonVPN2016
dataset and analyze it with kNN and C4.5 algorithms.
Many researchers adopt VPN-nonVPN2016 dataset and
report their results. For example, Yamansavascilar et al. [25]
utilize this dataset for application type classification and
compare the results with their own dataset using the same
2
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classes. They report that kNN works best for VPN-nonVPN
dataset and random forest produces most accurate results
on their own dataset. They also investigate feature selection
approaches and report 2% boost in the accuracy of their own
dataset. Wang et al. [24] use packet-level analysis and used
deep learning approach for protocol classification. Later, Yao
et al. [26] implement attention-based LSTM (Long Short-
Term Memory) to classify protocol types in VPN-nonVPN
dataset. On the other hand, Qin et al. [18] propose Hybrid
Flow Clustering (HFC) method to explore flow features and
link patterns in an unsupervised profiling view and achieve
impressive classification performance on network traffic data
obtained from three different open sources.
Previous studies show that the demand for analyzing net-
work flow is increasing and there is not a single trivial so-
lution for application classification or malware detection in
network analysis. Therefore, there is an urgent need of a
generic set of features that are known to be useful for mal-
ware detection and application classification with a more
comprehensive and up-to-date dataset.
3 NETML DATA COLLECTION
We now describe our collection of data from several sources.
We explain how we obtained raw data firstly for malware
detection task and then application type classification task.
Stratosphere IPS [20] and Canadian Institute of Cybersecu-
rity (CIC) [10, 19] are two sources of raw traffic data (i.e pcap
files) open to the public for research. CIC provides several dif-
ferent types of dataset for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
along with an application type classification dataset while
Stratosphere IPS only focus on numerous normal and mal-
ware captures. Three datasets are compiled from these two
sources of raw traffic data, referred as NetML, CICIDS2017
and non-vpn2016 for the rest of the paper. Raw capture data
are preprocessed if needed and flow features are extracted
using an Intel proprietary flow feature extraction tool.
In this paper, we focus broadly on flow classification tasks
for various purposes and at different granularity. We study
both malware detection, which is closely related to cyber-
security, and more general flow type identification. We use
"top-level", "mid-level" and "fine-grained" to denote the gran-
ularity levels. At "top-level", malware detection is a binary
benign or malware classification problem, while for flow
identification task, we annotate major application categories
such as chat, email, video etc. The "mid-level" identifies spe-
cific applications such as facebook, skype, hangouts etc. Fi-
nally, the "fine-grained" level performs multi-class classi-
fication to identify specific types of malware (e.g. Adload,
portScan etc.) and detailed types of application traffic such
as facebook_audio, skype_audio etc.
3.1 Dataset Preparation
We use an accelerated feature extraction library provided by
our sponsor Intel. It computes the features of a flow up to 200
packets in both directions. Given a raw traffic capture (pcap)
file as input to the feature extraction tool, flow features are
extracted in JSON format, and each flow sample is listed line
by line in the output file. List of computed features by the
feature extraction tool is given in Table 1.
We process the raw packet traces by following the steps
depicted in Figure 1. We use an accelerated feature extrac-
tion library provided by Intel to compute the features of
a flow up to 200 packets in both directions. Given a raw
traffic capture file as input to the feature extraction tool,
flow features are extracted in JSON format, and each flow
sample is listed line by line in the output file. Metadata fea-
tures are extracted for each flow sample and TLS, DNS and
HTTP features are extracted only if the flow sample contains
packets for the given protocols. After feature extraction, we
perform a little of preprocessing to prepare the dataset for a
fair evaluation. Firstly, IPs of source sa and destination da
are replaced with IP_masked string to mask the IPs so that
the flows are not traceable by the competitors during the
challenge. Secondly, time_start and time_end features are
removed and the time interval between the two is added as a
new feature called as time_length. Thirdly, a unique id num-
ber to identify each flow sample and the label information
of the flow according to the raw traffic packet capture file is
added to output JSON files to obtain the NetML, CICIDS2017
and non-vpn2016 datasets with 484056, 551372 and 163711
flows were obtained, respectively. Finally, the data are split
into three sets, namely test-challenge, test-std, and training
sets by allocating randomly selected 10% of any class to test-
challenge set, another randomly selected 10% to test-std set,
and the remaining 80% to training set. The whole process
for the data preparation is summarized in Figure 1.
3.2 Malware Detection Datasets
Our first task to focus on is detecting malware flows in net-
work traffic through routers. The details about how to create
our own dataset from these two sources are described in the
following two sections.
3.2.1 NetML. This dataset is created for malware detec-
tion task by obtaining 30 out of more than 300 raw traffic
data from Stratosphere IPS. Selected capture files are listed in
Table 2. Each capture file is assumed to contain flows belong-
ing to a single class. For example, all of the flows extracted
from capture_win15.pcap file are labeled as malware in the
top-level annotations and Artemis in the fine-grained an-
notations. Fine-grained class distribution of NetML dataset
is given in Figure 2. Top-level annotations contain benign
3
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Table 1: Description of flow features extracted by FFEL
Metadata Features
sa: source address
da: destination address
pr: protocol (6 or 17)
src_port: source port
dst_port: destination port
bytes_out: total bytes out
num_pkts_out: total packets out
bytes_in: total bytes in
num_pkts_in: total packets in
time_start: time stamp of first packet
time_end: time stamp of last packet
intervals_ccnt[]: compact histogram of pkt arriving intervals
ack_psh_rst_syn_fin_cnt[]: histogram of tcp flag counting
hdr_distinct: number of distinct values of header lengths
hdr_ccnt[]: compact histogram of header lengths
pld_distinct: number of distinct values of payload length
pld_ccnt[]: compact histogram of payload lengths
hdr_mean: mean value of header lengths
hdr_bin_40: # of pkts with header lengths between 28 and 40
pld_bin_128: # of pkts whose payload lengths are below 128
pld_bin_inf: # of pkts whose payload lengths are above 1024
pld_max: max value of payload length
pld_mean: mean value of payload length
pld_medium: medium value of payload length
pld_var: variance value of payload length
rev_...: flow features of the reverse flow
TLS Features
tls_cnt: number of tls packets
tls_len[]: array of tls payload length
tls_cs_cnt: number of ciphersuits
tls_cs[]: array of ciphersuits value
tls_ext_cnt: number of tls extensions
tls_ext_types[]: array of tls extensions
tls_key_exchange_len: length of tls key exchange
tls_svr_...: tls features advertised by the server
DNS Features
dns_query_cnt: number of dns query records
dns_query_name_len[]: array of dns query name lengths
dns_query_name[]: array of dns query names
dns_query_type[]: array of dns query types
dns_query_class[]: array of dns query classes
dns_answer_cnt: number of dns answer records
dns_answer_ttl[]: array of dns answer âĂĲtime to liveâĂİ values
dns_answer_ip[]: array of dns answer ips
HTTP Features
http_method: http request method
http_uri: http request uri
http_host: http request hostname
http_code: http code
http_content_type: http content_type
http_content_len: http content length
Figure 1: Flow diagram of dataset preparation
or malware classes and fine-grained annotations contain 20
different malware types and a benign class.
Table 2: Files used to create NetML dataset
Top-level Fine-grained Filename
benign benign 2013-12-17_capture1.pcap
benign benign 2017-04-18_win-normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-04-19_win-normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-04-25_win-normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-04-28_normal.pcap
benign benign 2017_04_30-normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-04-30_win-normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-05-01_normal.pcap
benign benign 2017-05-02_kali-normal.pcap
malware Adload 2018-05-03_win12.pcap
malware Artemis capture_win15.pcap
malware BitCoinMiner 2018-04-04_win16.pcap
malware CCleaner 2017-12-18_win2.pcap
malware CCleaner 2018-01-30_win17.pcap
malware Cobalt 2018-04-03_win11.pcap
malware Downware 2018-02-23_win10.pcap
malware Dridex 2018-04-03_win12.pcap
malware Emotet 2017-06-24_win3.pcap
malware HTBot 2018-04-04_win20.pcap
malware MagicHound 2017-11-22_win4.pcap
malware MinerTrojan 2018-03-27_win4.pcap
malware PUA 2018-02-16_win8.pcap
malware PUA 2018-02-23_win11.pcap
malware Ramnit 2018-04-03_win6.pcap
malware Sality 2017-11-23_win16.pcap
malware Tinba capture_win1.pcap
malware TrickBot capture_win11.pcap
malware Trickster 2018-01-29_win7.pcap
malware TrojanDownloader 2018-03-27_win23.pcap
malware Ursnif capture_win12.pcap
malware WebCompanion 2018-03-01_win9.pcap
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Figure 2: Class distribution of NetML dataset
3.2.2 CICIDS2017. CICIDS2017 [19] is a set of raw traffic
captures for different types of malware attacks and normal
flows. Each trace file contains the whole network traffic
throughout the day and 5 traces for each day of a week is
collected. However, only some specific time intervals with
packet exchange between the predetermined IP addresses
contain the flows we want to extract. Therefore, we down-
load CICIDS2017 dataset from the original source and filter
the flows-of-interest according to the descriptions in the
dataset website, and extract flow features using the flow fea-
ture extraction tool. Our method was unable to extract flow
features for âĂĲBotnetâĂİ and âĂĲHeartbleedâĂİ attacks
therefore they are excluded in our final CICIDS2017 dataset.
Extracted malware types and which file is used are given
in Table 3 and the fine-grained class distribution is shown
in Figure 3. Similar to the other malware detection dataset,
top-level annotations in CICIDS2017 dataset contain benign
or malware classes and fine-grained annotations contain 7
different malware types and a benign class.
Table 3: Files used to create CICIDS2017 dataset
Top-level Fine-grained Filename
benign benign Monday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware DDoS *Friday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware DoS *Wednesday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware ftp-patator *Tuesday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware infiltration *Thursday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware portScan *Friday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware ssh-patator *Tuesday-WorkingHours.pcap
malware webAttack *Thursday-WorkingHours.pcap
(*): These files are firstly filtered to obtain the flow-of-interest
then those files are used to extract flow features and give labels.
Figure 3: Class distribution of CICIDS2017 dataset
3.3 Traffic Classification Dataset:
non-vpn2016
The third dataset focuses on application type classification
and is called non-vpn2016. It is obtained by extracting flow
features using only the non-vpn raw traffic capture files
from the CIC website as our feature extraction tool does not
support VLAN processing yet.
Three levels of annotations are assigned to this dataset:
top-level, mid-level and fine-grained. Top-level annotations
are a general grouping of those traffic capture data and
7 classes are selected including P2P, audio, chat, email,
file_transfer, tor, video. Mid-level annotations contain 18
type of applications (facebook, skype etc.) while fine-grained
annotations identify 31 lower-level classes in an application
(facebook_audio, facebook_chat, skype_audio, skype_chat
etc.). Table 4 gives the list of files used to create non-vpn2016
dataset.
The numbers of output flow samples after feature extrac-
tion for top-level, mid-level and fine-grained annotations are
provided in Figure 4-6.
The imbalance of number of samples in a dataset is an
important but mostly inevitable. For example, we observe in
Figure 6 that facebook_audio, hangouts_audio. skype_audio
and skype_file classes are oversampled in the dataset. Such
significantly imbalanced class distribution may introduce a
bias to the predictions of the trained models.
4 NETML DATASET ANALYSIS
In this section we an analysis of the flow features for the
training sets of all three datasets. We extract four set of fea-
tures: (1) Metadata, (2) TLS, (3) DNS, (4) HTTP. Metadata
features are protocol-independent features such as number
of packets, bytes inbound and bytes outbound, time length
5
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Table 4: Files used to create non-vpn2016 dataset
Top, Mid, Fine-grained Filename
chat, aim, aim_chat AIMchat*.pcapng
chat, aim, aim_chat aim_chat_3*.pcap
email, email, email email*.pcap
audio, facebook, facebook_audio facebook_audio*.pcap
audio, facebook, facebook_audio facebook_audio*.pcapng
chat, facebook, facebook_chat facebookchat*.pcapng
chat, facebook, facebook_chat facebook_chat_4*.pcap
video, facebook, facebook_video facebook_video*.pcap
video, facebook, facebook_video facebook_video*.pcapng
file_transfer, ftps, ftps_down ftps_down_1*.pcap
file_transfer, ftps, ftps_up ftps_up_2*.pcap
chat, gmail, gmail_chat gmailchat*.pcapng
audio, hangouts, hangouts_audio hangouts_audio*.pcap
audio, hangouts, hangouts_audio hangouts_audio*.pcapng
chat, hangouts, hangouts_chat hangout_chat_4b.pcap
chat, hangouts, hangouts_chat hangouts_chat_4a.pcap
video, hangouts, hangouts_video hangouts_video*.pcap
video, hangouts, hangouts_video hangouts_video*.pcapng
chat, icq, icq_chat ICQchat*.pcapng
chat, icq, icq_chat icq_chat_3*.pcap
video, netflix, netflix netflix*.pcap
file_transfer, scp, scp_down scpDown*.pcap
file_transfer, scp, scp_up scpUp*.pcap
file_transfer, sftp, sftp_down scpDown*.pcap
file_transfer, sftp, sftp_down scp_down_3*.pcap
file_transfer, sftp, sftp_up scpUp1.pcap
file_transfer, sftp, sftp_up scp_up_2*.pcap
audio, skype, skype_audio skype_audio*.pcap
audio, skype, skype_audio skype_audio*.pcapng
chat, skype, skype_chat skype_chat1*.pcap
file_transfer, skype, skype_file skype_file*.pcap
file_transfer, skype, skype_file skype_file*.pcapng
video, skype, skype_video skype_video*.pcap
video, skype, skype_video skype_video*.pcapng
audio, spotify, spotify spotify*.pcap
tor, facebook, tor_facebook torFacebook.pcap
tor, google, tor_google torGoogle.pcap
P2P, torrent, torrent Torrent01.pcapng
tor, twitter, tor_twitter torTwitter.pcap
video, vimeo, tor_vimeo torVimeo*.pcap
video, youtube, tor_youtube torYoutube*.pcap
video, vimeo, vimeo vimeo*.pcap
audio, voipbuster, voipbuster voipbuster*.pcapng
audio, voipbuster, voipbuster voipbuster_4*.pcap
video, youtube, youtube youtube*.pcap
of a flow etc. On the other side, there are protocol-specific
features such as TLS, DNS and HTTP. Number of cipher-
suites and extensions supported by the client or server are a
subset of the TLS features. Similarly, DNS query name and
DNS answer IP can be given as example for DNS features.
Finally, HTTP code and HTTP method are two examples for
Figure 4: Class distribution of non-vpn2016 dataset
with top-level labeling
Figure 5: Class distribution of non-vpn2016 dataset
with mid-level labeling
HTTP features. While Metadata features can be extracted
for any kind of flow, protocol-specific features can only be
extracted if the given flow contains packets with one of these
protocols. Therefore, Table 5 summarizes number of flows
in each dataset containing Metadata, TLS, DNS and HTTP
features.
The training sets for NetML, CICIDS2017 and non-vpn2016
datasets include 387268, 441116 and 131065 flow samples,
respectively.
4.1 Metadata Features
Metadata features are mostly composed of statistical fea-
tures or histograms computed in a flow. Return values are a
constant size of array for the histogram-like features such
6
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Figure 6: Class distribution of non-vpn2016 dataset
with fine-grained labeling
Table 5: Number of flow features for each training set
Metadata TLS DNS HTTP
NetML 387,268 114,396 60,271 46,503
CICIDS2017 441,116 74,836 93,224 40,339
non-vpn2016 131,065 1,262 8,179 548
as intervals_ccnt[] and hdr_ccnt[]. The averaged mean val-
ues for each of these features dimensions are calculated and
given in Figure 18,19 and Figure 20,21. Horizontal axis gives
the index number in the returned array and vertical axis
represents the mean value of that dimension in the given
dataset.
Unlike histogram arrays, the other Metadata features such
as bytes_in or src_prt return a single value such as 160 or 6006.
Class probability distribution for those Metadata features
are provided in Figures 10-17. Horizontal axis represents the
returned value of the feature while vertical axis gives the
number of occurrences for that value. For all figures, 100
equally sized bins are used to plot the distributions.
Distribution of Metadata features shows us which features
are more discriminating in the given context. For example,
hdr_bin_40 feature tends to have smaller values in malware
classes when compared to benign flows. Similarly, for the
non-vpn2016 set, the same feature mostly contains smaller
values especially for P2P, chat, email and tor classes. On
the other hand, there is one outlier example in time_length
feature of NetML training set which has the value around
7 million therefore causing the histogram to be awkwardly
plotted. However, we are not going to clean the data for the
scope of this study and leave it for the future studies.
Metadata features can be extracted for any flow samples. In
this study, 31 different Metadata features are extracted using
the flow feature extraction library. For NetML training set, all
of the flow samples, i.e. 387268 produces all of the Metadata
features. Similarly, CICIDS2017 training set contains 441116
flows with Metadata features and non-vpn2016 training set
contains 131065 flows with all those Metadata features listed
in Table 1.
4.2 TLS Features
Several client-based and server-based TLS-specific features
are used in our study. Some of these TLS features are the
list of offered ciphersuites, the list of advertised extensions
and the key exchange length advertised by client and server.
In total, 14 different TLS features are extracted. For NetML
training set, 114396 flow samples contain TLS features which
corresponds to nearly 30% of the whole training set. For CI-
CIDS2017, 74836 or in other words almost 15% TLS-contained
flow samples are extracted while for non-vpn2016 it is only
1262 corresponding to less than 1% of the whole training set.
Figure 22,23 and Figure 24,25 depict the single-valued
feature class distribution for NetML, CICIDS2017 and non-
vpn2016 training sets for client advertised and server adver-
tised features, respectively. Similar toMetadata single-valued
features, horizontal axis represents the value returned by the
feature extraction tool and vertical axis gives the number of
occurrences of that value in the corresponding data set.
First two rows of Figure 26,27 show size of the return
array values on horizontal axis and number of occurrences
on vertical axis. On the other hand, the remaining 4 rows
shows the offered ciphersuites and supported TLS extensions
for three training sets. Horizontal axis values represent a
unique index number of ciphersuite or extension type with
the number of occurrences on vertical axis. Index value to
ciphersuite of extension type mapping for those 4 features
are provided in the appendix.
We observe 122 unique hex codes in the lists of offered
ciphersuites and 38 unique hex codes in the lists of supported
TLS extensions in NetML training set. Similarly, 11 unique
hex codes in the lists if offered ciphersuites and supported
TLS extensions are obtained from the CICIDS2017 training
set and 16 unique ciphersuites and 12 TLS extensions are ob-
served in the non-vpn2016 training set. Commonly used hex
values are provided in Figures 34 and 35 for all three datasets.
It is interesting to note that P2P class of non-vpn2016 dataset
does not contain any flows with TLS features. We do not
compare these hex code inter-datasets for the scope of this
paper. Finally, a single integer value is returned to represent
the other TLS count features and key exchange lengths.
4.3 DNS Features
Our feature extraction tool returns several DNS query
and answer features listed in Table 1. Similar to TLS fea-
tures, there are both single-valued and array-like features
7
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in DNS involved flows. For example, dns_query_cnt and
dns_answer_cnt features have a single integer value returned
while the other DNS query and answer features return array
of integers for dns_answer_ttl and strings for the rest. For
NetML training set, 60271 flow samples contain DNS features
which corresponds to around 15% of the whole training set.
For CICIDS2017, 93224 or in other words almost 21% of the
training set contains DNS features while for non-vpn2016
it is only 8179 corresponding to less than 7% of the whole
training set.
Figure 28,29 show single-values DNS features. We can
see that dns_query_cnt feature returns always 1 no matter
what the input is, therefore can be discarded in the classi-
fication algorithm. On the other hand, Figure 30,31 show
the class distribution for array-like DNS flow features. For
dns_query_name and dns_answer_ip features, horizontal axis
represents the index value for the query name of answer IP
while vertical axis gives the number of occurrences of that
particular feature while the other DNS feature plots gives the
length of the returned array versus number of occurrences.
Similar to dns_query_cnt, dns_query_class feature returns
always 1 therefore can be ignored for the further analysis.
We analyze the commonly used dns_answer_ip and
dns_query_name features. Figures 36 and 37 shows top-5
most commonly used values for those features acquired from
NetML, CICIDS2017 and non-vpn2016 training sets, respec-
tively. Interestingly, most of the flows with DNS feature have
an empty space for the dns_answer_ip feature for all classes
of three datasets except P2P of non-vpn2016.
4.4 HTTP Features
For each flow containing HTTP packets, we extract 6 differ-
ent HTTP features listed in Table 1. http_method, http_code
and http_content_len are the only features which are rep-
resented as a single integer value while the others contain
string datatype which needs to be processed before classifica-
tion. For http_uri, http_host and http_content_type features,
each value is stored with an index mapping to an integer
number.
Figures 38 and 39 showswhich http_content_type, http_host
and http_uri values are commonly used for each top-level
annotations of the three datasets. It is clear to observe that
http_content_type feature is very important to classify benign
samples from malware flows such that for both malware de-
tection datasets text/html is the mostly observed in malware
flows. In other words, if a flow contains some other value for
this particular feature our model could make a strong guess
by predicting the given sample does not belong to a malware
flow. Similarly, for the application classification dataset, each
class has different most commonly used values for this fea-
ture. It should be noted that for the same reasons observed
in TLS features, Tor class in non-vpn dataset is observed not
to contain any HTTP related features in the limited amount
of collected samples.
5 NETML CHALLENGE BASELINES
In this section, we demonstrate how the above three pro-
posed datasets can be used for flow analysis. We present the
implementation and evaluation of several classical machine
learning methods (called baselines). We use training dataset
to train the machine learning models and use the test-std
set to assess their effectiveness. Unless stated otherwise all
the numbers presented in this section are obtained from the
test-std sets.
5.1 Baselines
We select three basic classification models including Ran-
dom Forest, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) classifiers as our baselines since Random
Forest is easy to train, SVM is widely used and proved to be
useful in many applications and MLP offers a great potential
for deep learning that can achieve significant improvements
in the accuracy. These baseline models are trained using the
SK-learn library of python scripting language. As explained
in Section 4, protocol specific (TLS, DNS and HTTP) features
are not available for all of the flows in the datasets. Therefore,
we use only Metadata features to obtain baseline results.
We select three basic classification models including Ran-
dom Forest, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) classifiers as our baselines since Random
Forest is easy to train, SVM is widely used and proved to be
useful in many applications and MLP offers a great potential
for deep learning that can achieve significant improvements
in the accuracy for many other fields. These baselines are
trained using the SK-learn library of pyhton scripting lan-
guage.
5.1.1 Random Forest Classifier. The random forest clas-
sifier consists of many individual decision tree classifiers
working as in an ensemble model. Each decision tree clas-
sifier in the random forest produces a class estimate and
the top-rated class is chosen as the final decision. We pick
this classifier model as baseline since it is very easy and fast
to implement such a simple but surprisingly very accurate
classifier. We select 100 estimators and set maximum depth
to 10 to design the random forest classifier.
5.1.2 Support Vector Machine Classifier. Support Vector
Machines (SVM) are one of the widely accepted supervised
machine learning algorithms. The idea is to define a hyper-
plane that best separates the two support vectors for two
datasets where support vectors are the closest sample point
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of a class to decision boundary and therefore the most impor-
tant element of this classifier. One of the advantages of SVM
classifier is that they are proven to be accurate for many
different problems. On the other hand, the biggest disadvan-
tage is that the training time gets very high with the large
datasets as those we provide in this study. However, this
problem can be evaded by setting the number of samples in
the training set to small enough and reserving the rest as
validation set. Design parameters for SVM classifier are set
to default values, i.e. regularization parameter C is 1.0 and
chosen kernel is radial basis function (rbf).
5.1.3 Multi-Layer Perceptron Classifier. A perceptron is
a single node with multiple inputs and a single output. The
output is obtained by passing the linear combination of each
input to an activation function, which is usually determined
to be sigmoid function. Multi-layer Perceptron classifier is
formed with many perceptrons in multiple linear layers. The
most widely applied MLP classifiers contain input layer, hid-
den layer, and output layer.
MLP classifiers are also referred as Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANN) for Feed-Forward Neural Networks (FFNN).
Training of MLP classifier is implemented with a back prop-
agation technique which lead the model to learn robust rep-
resentations in the training set. Deep neural networks are
different implementations of MLPs which contain many hid-
den layers.
Artificial Neural Network based approaches are widely
proposed in many recent studies and they are proven to be
more accurate than traditional machine learning methods
such as Random Forest and SVM classifiers in many appli-
cations. Therefore, in this study, we select MLP as another
baseline, but we only focus on the basic implementation of
ANN with a single hidden layer. Hyper-parameters for the
designed baseline are 121 units in the hidden layer, L2 regu-
larization factor alpha as 0.0001. Optimizer is chosen to be
adam to train the model.
5.2 Preprocessing
As explained in Section 4, TLS, DNS and HTTP flow features
are not available for all of the flows in the datasets. Therefore,
we use only Metadata features to obtain baseline results.
The baseline classifiers require the input data as a two-
dimensional array whose columns represent features and
rows stand for flow samples. Therefore, we need to con-
vert the given data into matrix format. Firstly, we discard
source and destination IP address features as they are already
masked. All other Metadata features in the datasets contain
numeric values and hence it is straight-forward to import
these datasets into a matrix form that will be used to train
the classifiers. For array-like features such as hdr_ccnt[], we
just treat each of those dimensions in this array as a separate
Figure 7: Input data processing for Machine Learning
model training/prediction. - F.E.: Feature Extraction
feature such as hdr_ccnt_0, hdr_ccnt_1 etc. up to hdr_ccnt_k
for k+1 dimensional hdr_ccnt[] feature and place each of
those into seperate columns in the final data matrix. Figure 7
represents how the network traffic is captured and processed
to build sample-feature matrices.
Before training, the data is standardized in the preprocess-
ing step so that data in each feature column follows standard
normal distribution. For Random Forest and MLP classifiers,
80% of the training set is kept for training the model and
the remaining 20% is used as validation set. However, only
10% of the training set is used to train the SVM model while
the remaining 90% is used for validation because the time
complexity of the SVM algorithm is too high with the given
size of training set.
5.3 Results
We provide the classification results of 7 different scenarios
in this section. All of the baseline models are trained data
in the training set and results are obtained from the test-std
set.
Malware detection problem is a binary classification task
which can be best described by using detection rate and false
alarm rate of malware. Our NetML and CICIDS2017 datasets
used with top-level annotations are a binary detection prob-
lem and therefore we use detection rate and false alarm rate
to analyze the model performance. Detection rate is indi-
cated by True Positive Rate (TPR). TPR and False Alarm Rate
(FAR) are calculated by the equation (1).
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
, FAR =
FP
TN + FP
(1)
Fine-grained malware classification problems with NetML
and CICIDS2017 datasets used with fine-grained annotations
and traffic classification problems of non-vpn2016 dataset
for all top-level, mid-level and fine-grained annotations are
multi-class classification tasks and best described by F1 and
mean average precision (mAP) scores which are calculated
according to equation (2)
9
To be submitted for review to NetAI Workshop at SIGCOMM, 2020 B.et al.
F1 = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall(precision + recall) ,mAP =
1
N
N∑
i=1
APi (2)
where N is the number of samples and APi is the average
precision ith class.
Table 6: Baseline results for malware detection
RF SVM MLP
TPR | FAR TPR | FAR TPR | FAR
NetML 0.9937 | 0.0092 0.9624 | 0.0137 0.9887 | 0.0171
CICIDS 0.9859 | 0.0044 0.9780 | 0.0028 0.9872 | 0.0069
5.3.1 Malware detection. Table 6 shows the TPR and FAR
scores for both malware detection datasets which are NetML
and CICIDS2017 used with top-level annotations. Interest-
ingly, Random Forest model which is the most trivial ap-
proach works best among other baseline models for the bi-
nary classification problem. For NetML dataset, highest TPR
and lowest FAR are achieved by RF model with scores 0.9937
and 0.0092, respectively. SVMmodel has the lowest TPR with
0.9624; however, it performs better in terms of FAR when
compared to MLP model whose TPR is better but FAR is the
worst. For CICIDS2017 dataset, we observe that MLP model
has the highest TPR rate 0.9872. However, unlike the case
for NetML dataset, SVM model achieves the lowest FAR rate
with 0.0028 for CICIDS2017 dataset.
5.3.2 Multi-class classification. To gain further insights,
we use fine-grained annotations for each malware type and
construct a multi-class classification problem. Similarly, traf-
fic classification dataset non-vpn2016 has multiple classes
for each level of annotations. Table 7 gives the F1 and mAP
scores for multi-class class classification problems.
Table 7: Baseline results for multi-class classification
scenarios
RF SVM MLP
F1 |mAP F1 |mAP F1 |mAP
NetML-f 0.7442 | 0.4217 0.6959 | 0.3536 0.7314 | 0.4116
CICIDS-f 0.9872 | 0.8682 0.9850 | 0.8621 0.9889 | 0.8966
non-vpn-t 0.6273 | 0.3257 0.5868 | 0.1934 0.6066 | 0.2304
non-vpn-m 0.3693 | 0.3223 0.3441 | 0.1398 0.3609 | 0.2041
non-vpn-f 0.2486 | 0.2127 0.2036 | 0.0768 0.2359 | 0.1404
t, m and f stand for top, mid and fine-grained annotations, respectively.
NetML - fine-grained multi-class classification
Among all baselines, similar to the malware detection task,
even though MLP model produces comparable results, RF
model performs as the most accurate model with F1 score
0.7442 and mAP 0.4217.
Figure 8: Confusion matrices of NetML test-std re-
sults obtained by Random Forest model (left) and CI-
CIDS2017 test-std results obtained by MLP (right)
CICIDS2017 - fine-grainedmulti-class classification
Random forest and SVM models perform comparable for
multi-class malware classification problem. Similar to binary
malware detection case, MLP model has the highest F1 score
0.9889 and mAP score 0.8966.
Figure 8 presents confusion matrices of best performing
models for both NetML and CICIDS2017 dataset results ob-
tained from test-std set. We observe that for NetML dataset
Adload and TrickBot classes are commonly confused by other
class predictions. Similarly, TrickBot and Trickster classes are
mostly confused by the model. Interestingly, Artemis class is
mostly predicted as Ursnif and there is no other class pre-
dicted as Ursnif. For CICIDS2017 dataset, we observe some
misclassification between infiltration and benign classes. But
most importantly, webAttack class is barely detected and
usually misclassified by the model as benign class. For DDoS
class, we observe 100% accuracy and for ssh-patator there is
only one flow sample missed by the model and all others are
correctly detected with no false alarm.
It is worth noting that multi-class classification results
achieve lower FAR rate in exchange with a slightly reduced
detection rate when considered as binary malware detection.
For example, multi-class classifier with Random Forest model
for NetML dataset produces 0.0051 FAR with 0.9922 TPR.
Similarly, for CICIDS2017 dataset, comparable TPR 0.9865 is
achieved with better FAR 0.0067 using MLP model.
non-vpn2016 - top-level classification
We observe weak performance of all three baseline models
for non-vpn2016 dataset. Although the F1 and mAP score
are poor, the best performing model is again Random Forest
model with F1 score 0.6273 and mAP score 0.3257.
non-vpn2016 - mid-level classification
We also use mid-level annotations to classify the network
traffic according to the application type. Similar to protocol
classification with top-level annotations, the scores are not
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Figure 9: Confusion matrices of non-vpn2016 test-std
results obtained by Random Forest model
impressive; however, Random Forest model is the most ac-
curate baseline model among all with F1 score 0.3693 and
mAP score 0.3223.
non-vpn2016 - fine-grained classification
Lastly, we present the baseline results for action classifi-
cation with fine-grained annotations. As observed in appli-
cation type classification and protocol classification tasks,
Random Forest model is again the best performing baseline
model with poor F1 score 0.2486 and mAP score 0.2127
Figure 9 gives three confusion matrices for 3 level of an-
notations of non-vpn2016 dataset. We observe that all other
classes are biased to mispredict a flow sample to audio class.
Likewise, skype class for mid-level annotations and face-
book_audio class for fine-grained annotations are the classes
which bias the model to mispredict. The reason for such a
bias would be due to the number of samples in the training
set. These specified classes constitute the majority of the
training sets and they are overwhelming the model causing
the bias in prediction.
6 NETML CHALLENGE ANDWORKSHOP
We have set up an evaluation server for the participants to
submit their prediction results for the test and challenge
sets so that we can generate scores and list a leaderboard.
We organize the first challenge and workshop to facilitate a
systematic progress in network traffic analytics. The first in-
stance of the workshop will be held at IJCAI 2020. We recom-
mend that papers reporting results on NetML, CICIDS2017
and non-vpn2016 datasets described here should:
• report results on test-std set displayed in the evaluation
server leaderboard
• report TPR and FAR for binary classification
• report F1 and mAP for multi-class classification
• compare their results with baseline results presented
in this paper
For further details and descriptions about the challenge,
please visit the challenge page on github https://www.github.
com/ACANETS/NetML-Competition2020
7 CONCLUSION
To enable data driven machine learning based research in
network flow analytics, we introduce NetML datasets cu-
rated from open-sources for malware detection and network
traffic classification. We release the flow features and dif-
ferent levels of annotations, aiming to present a common
dataset for research community. In this paper, we character-
ize the features of each dataset and present baseline results
for 7 different scenarios using three commonly used ma-
chine learning models. We observe that Random Forest is
the best performing model for malware detection tasks, but
it lacks accuracy for traffic classification problems due to
class imbalance.
Our results have inspired potential future work including,
for example, using deep learning models to achieve a higher
accuracy for the fine-grained classification tasks and imple-
menting somemeasurements such as SMOTE [4] to deal with
class imbalance and hence obtain an unbiased prediction for
traffic classification. We expect that the NetML datasets will
promote machine learning based network traffic analytics
and establish a common ground for researchers to propose
and benchmark their approaches in this AI era.
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Figure 10: Metadata single value features - 1
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 11: Metadata single value features - 1
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 12: Metadata single value features - 2
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 13: Metadata single value features - 2
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 14: Metadata single value features - 3
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 15: Metadata single value features - 3
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 16: Metadata single value features - 4
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 17: Metadata single value features - 4
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 18: Metadata histogram-like Features - 1
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 19: Metadata histogram-like Features - 1
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 20: Metadata histogram-like Features - 2
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 21: Metadata histogram-like Features - 2
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 22: TLS Features offered/supported by client
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 23: TLS Features offered/supported by client
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 24: TLS Features offered/supported by server
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 25: TLS Features offered/supported by server
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 26: TLS histogram-like features
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 27: TLS histogram-like features
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 28: DNS single-valued features
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 29: DNS single-valued features
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 30: DNS array-like features
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 31: DNS array-like features
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 32: HTTP features
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 33: HTTP features
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 34: Most common TLS ciphersuites and exten-
tion types
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 35: Most common TLS ciphersuites and exten-
tion types
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 36: Most common DNS answer IP and query
names
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 37: Most common DNS answer IP and query
names
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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Figure 38: Most commonHTTP content type, host and
uri
(Left: NetML dataset , Right: CICIDS2017 dataset)
Figure 39: Most commonHTTP content type, host and
uri
(non-vpn2016 dataset)
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